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11 December 1961

Copy No.

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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DAILY BRIEF

25X1	ently remains stalemated. According to press reports, Katangan forces have attacked UN positions on the outskirts of the city, so far without success. The UN retains its air superiority, and it has received armored cars from else- where in the Congo; however, it remains unable or unwilling to take the offensive on the ground. UN headquarters in Leopoldville—which seems to be receiving only sporadic in- formation from its commanders in Katanga—is attempting to move further reinforcements to Elisabethville and also to Manono, where the UN garrison is under increasing pressure from a 750-man Katangan force.	
25X1	The UN's inability so far to break Katangan resistance	
	seems to have consolidated the position of Katangan extremists such as Interior Minister Munongo, who reportedly assumed complete control of the government during Tshombé's recent absence. The Katangan forces are said to consider the continuing military standoff as a sign of victory for them, and they might not obey a cease-fire order even if Tshombé should issue one. Anti-American feeling is spreading among the Katangans. Violent demonstrations against the American Consulate in Elisabethville, which apparently were organized by the youth wing of Tshombé's Conakat party, took place on 10 December. Except for official US representatives, most of the Americans in Katanga now have been evacuated.	25X1 25X1
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	India-Portugal: Tension over the Goa problem appears
	to have eased slightly. Isolated shooting incidents continue to be reported by both sides, however, and extremist elements
	in the divided Goan nationalist movement in India, encouraged by the Indian military buildup in the border area, are continuing
	attempts to set off disturbances within the Portuguese territories
	11 Dec 61 DAILY BRIEF ii
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25X1	widespread enoug	h to force Indian action.		25X1
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	8 December that sent to the scene cials are unlikely	s not yet reacted to Lisbon's printerior of the control of the con	servers" be ; Indian offi- ation of the	25X1
USSR-Berlin: Khrushchev's threatening tone in his 9 December speech and the signs of further Communist moves on the Berlin situation seem intended to exert pressure on the West during the current consultations in Paris. A Soviet protest on US troop movements on the Berlin autobahn seems likely in view of the Soviet commandant's request for a meeting with General Watson on 11 December. The So-				
25X1	viet and East German press have given increased emphasis to charges that rotation of US troops in Berlin constitutes an "aggressive act"; they assert that these troops are under NATO command and are therefore not guaranteed free passage under the Soviet - East German agreement of September 1955. The East German Foreign Ministry has also scheduled a press conference for 12 December, which will probably deal with US actions as well as the East German announcement of 8 December confirming that "as customary" all vehicles			
	tification."			
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*USSR-Albania-China: The USSR's rupture of diplomatic and economic relations with Albania constitutes Moscow's most serious challenge to date to the Chinese Communists, who, if they continue to support Albania as they have in the past, must now endorse a regime which is clearly and formally outside the bloc. The extension of the dispute from the gray area of party relations to the concrete sphere of governmental relations will serve as a sharp warning to the Chinese and other Communists that Khrushchev is willing to use extreme measures in order to reassert Soviet leadership of the bloc. Moscow's action—which will probably be imitated by the East European satellites—also forces an unwelcome choice on the leaders of North Korea and North Vietnam, who had been trying to occupy a middle ground between Moscow and Peiping.

The Soviet move makes the dispute between Moscow and its supporters on one side and Albania and the Chinese on the other almost impossible to reconcile and therefore appears to rule out agreement by Soviet leaders to any bloc meeting to consider the points at issue between the Soviet and Albanian parties. Khrushchev is making it clear that he considers the issue one of power and national interest and that he looks upon the struggle as one not to be compromised but to be unremittingly pursued. While the Soviet notes as published in the Albanian press clearly foreshadow formal action to suspend Tirana's membership in the Warsaw Pact, there is no hint that Moscow is developing a pretext for direct military intervention.

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			25X1
is apparently visit of 16 as security pre interfere. If in Caracas a recently injective anti-government the break in in early Now casualties, Communistment's move tremists we seized, and political ally Pro-Cabreak in dip		colombia. The Venezuelan Coment on trying to disrupt Presider December, but the government on a small paramilitary unit on student sympathizers, the Colombia a strong anti-Kennedy note in disturbances they have been caused a strong anti-Kennedy note in disturbances they have been caused. The rioting has led to sever recently on 8 December, but the structure of the Communist prested, sizable quantities of whe adquarters of the Communist e Leftist Revolutionary Movem groups in Colombia may seize the crelations with Cuba on 9 December of the breather action. Prior to the breather action.	ent Kennedy's at's extensive by's ability to t of about 200 communists have the sporadic arrying on since arrying on since areal police the disruptive by the govern- aumber of ex- reapons were party and its ent, were closed. on Colombia's ecember as a
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25X1	extremists had been reported planning to limit their anti-	25X1
	Kennedy activity to propaganda. The break was provoked by Castro's 8 December public attack on Colombia.	25X1
25X1	Trinidad: Premier Eric Williams of Trinidad, in his first public appearance since his party's landslide electoral victory on 4 December, described the 10-month-old agreement between the US, UK, and West Indies regarding the Chaguaramas naval base and other facilities as "dead." He almost certainly will demand negotiation of a new agreement, in the hope of extracting more aid, rather than elimination of the US base.	
25X1	Williams also repudiated the West Indies Federation. Since Jamaica had already rejected federation in a referendum, Williams' long-awaited stand probably completes its destruction and will leave Britain with its other eastern Caribbean dependencies as economic liabilities indefinitely. (Backup, Page 1)	
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Trinidad's Premier Denounces West Indies Federation

/In a public speech on 6 December Williams denounced the West Indies Federation as "one of the most disgraceful episodes in the history of the West Indies." Williams claimed that the people of Trinidad had themselves rejected federation in the 4 December elections when they elected only 9 members of the pro-Federation opposition party to 20 of Williams' party, which had been noncommittal on this issue.

Williams sufficiently dominates his party and government to bring about Trinidad's withdrawal. Through the petroleum industry and other industrial and agricultural activities Trinidad could support itself with little outside aid, and London will concede independence if Williams insists.

Despite the seeming finality of Williams' remarks, London may not yet abandon all hope that the premier may be induced by increased aid offers to change his mind. The British do not want to be left with a continuing burden of financing the unviable smaller eastern Caribbean islands.

Under the Defense Areas Agreement, legally valid for 17 years, which Williams signed in February 1961 in his capacity as Trinidad's premier, the United States this year is providing Trinidad with \$17,300,000 in grants and loans. In addition to the naval base, under the agreement the United States retains a radar research facility on Trinidad. Collapse of the Federation and loss of Jamaica's and Trinidad's economic support are also likely to develop pressure for more aid from the US in St. Lucia and Antigua, where other important missile-tracking and space-research facilities are located.

also likely to develop pressure for more aid from the US in St. Lucia and Antigua, where other important missile-tracking and space-research facilities are located.

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